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Abstract
A model for the joint evolution of opinions and how much the
agents trust each other is presented. The model is built using the
framework of the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA)
model. Instead of a fixed probability that the other agents will decide
in the favor of the best choice, each agent considers that other agents
might be one one of two types: trustworthy or useless. Trustworthy
agents are considered more likely to be right than wrong, while the
opposite holds for useless ones. Together with the opinion about the
discussed issue, each agent also updates that probability for each one of
the other agents it interacts withe probability each one it interacts with
is of one type or the other. The dynamics of opinions and the evolution
of the trust between the agents are studied. Clear evidences of the
existence of two phases, one where strong polarization is observed
and the other where a clear division is permanent and reinforced are
observed. The transition seems signs of being a first-order transition,
with a location dependent on both the parameters of the model and
the initial conditions. This happens despite the fact that the trust
network evolves much slower than the opinion on the central issue.
Keywords:Opinion Dynamics, CODA model, Trust
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1 Introduction
Opinion Dynamics models [1] are usually built on the idea that each agent
will influence others, either all of them, if one assumes a complete graph of
connections, or a set of all agents that compose its neighborhood. In the most
common case, agents somehow change their opinions towards the opinion
of those neighbors, either by a simple imitative process in discrete models
[2, 3, 4, 5] or moving the values of their opinion in the direction of the value of
the neighbor opinion, in the continuous models [6, 7]. A mixed version exists
in the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Action (CODA) model [8, 9], where
the continuous values are not observed and only a discrete choice is known
by the neighbors. CODA model variations have been shown to be equivalent
to the continuous models [10] as well as a general case to the discrete models
in the literature [11].
However, it is not true that people always tend to copy those they ob-
serve. Depending on their own characteristics and those of the person one is
interacting with, observation might either have no consequences or make the
person who observes want to avoid the observed characteristic [12]. This idea
has been implemented in different ways in different models. No influence has
been coded as a threshold in the continuous Bounded Confidence models and
as inflexible agents who don’t change their opinions in discrete [13, 14, 15]
and mixed [16] models. The negative influence has also been studied by the
introduction of “contrarians” [17, 18] who change their opinions in the oppo-
site direction of the influence on them. In more general terms, the problem
of trust in Opinion Dynamics models has been explored for a number of dif-
ferent models [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. In most cases mentioned here, the trust
between agents is not subject to the dynamics of the models, with exception
of one case [20].
It is clear, however, that, as our opinion about a certain subject changes,
so does our opinion about the person who influenced us. And, in reverse, it
is also true that we interpret the same information differently depending on
its source [25]. Here, we will present a generalization of the CODA model
where the agents change their opinions about the issue and also about the
reliability of the other agents.
2
2 Trust and Likelihood
The original CODA model [10, 26] was obtained by assuming that, in a situ-
ation where there were two possible choices (or actions), each agent considers
there is a fixed probability α > 0.5 that each one of its neighbors will have
chosen the best alternative. Let the two choices be A and B and let pi(t)
be the probability agent i assigns at time t to the probability that A is the
best choice. CODA adopts a fixed likelihood α ≡ P (OAj|A), representing
the chance that, if A is indeed the best choice, when observing agent j, i
will observe j chose A, indicated here by OAj. Assuming that the problem
is symmetrical in relation to both choices, that is,
P (OAj|A) = P (OBj|B),
a simple use of Bayes theorem will show how pi(t) is altered. By using
log-odd function ν ≡ ln( p
1−p
) (where the agent index and time dependence
were omitted for brevity), a simple additive model is obtained. This can
be trivially normalized to ν∗ so that when A is observed, the agent adds
+1 to ν∗, and when B is observed, −1 is added. In this case, the choice is
defined simply by the sign of ν∗, with positive signs indicating A is chosen.
Defined in this way, the model becomes actually independent of α, except
for translating the number of steps away from changing opinions back into a
probability. For the non-symmetrical case, the likelihoods for choosing A or
B could be different and, in this case, the negative and positive steps will no
longer have the same size. While, in principle, one could use a normalization
where one of the steps is changed to a size of one, there is no strong reason
to do that, as the final model will no longer be as simple as the symmetric
case.
Contrarians were previously introduced in the symmetrical case simply
by assigning a percentage of agents who actually reacted with the opposite
sign from the original model [18]. This is actually equivalent to a supposition
that the contrarian neighbors are more likely to be wrong than right, that
is, they actually have a likelihood of being right given by
µ = 1− α < 0.5. (1)
Of course, the assumption that µ and α add to one is a simplifying one. It
actually makes no difference in the dynamics of choices, since, for each agent,
in that model, one could define the renormalized number of steps according
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to the agent own likelihoods. This was due to the fact that each agent treated
all other agents it interacted with in the same way, contrarians, in the model,
simply believed their neighbors were more likely to be wrong than right.
However, if one wants to introduce the possibility that people trust some
people more than others, it makes sense to introduce a trust matrix τij that
represents how much agent i thinks agent j is likely to be more reliable than
useless. That is, according to agent i there is a probability τij that the choices
of agent j have a probability α > 0.5 of being right (that is that agent j is
trustworthy (T )) and a probability 1 − τij that those choices have a chance
µ < 0.5 of being the best ones (j is useless U). Each agent believes there are
two types of agents, T who are likely to make the right choices, and useless
U , more likely to choose wrong. In both cases, the agents realize that there is
a probability that each of its neighbors will not act according to its character,
that is, trustworthy agents have a chance to be wrong (1 − α) and useless
agents have a chance to pick the best choice randomly also (1− µ).
Obtaining the update rule in this case is a simple application of the Bayes
Theorem, as per the framework in the CODA model [9]. Each agent i believes
at time t the chance that A is the best choice is given by pi(t). At that time,
it observes an agent j, whom i believes has a probability τij of being of the
T type, meaning j would chose A with probability α and B with probability
1−α. If agent j is a type U , which happens with probability 1−τij , it would,
instead, choose A with probability µ and B with probability 1− µ.
Assuming that OAj is observed, that is, that j is observed to prefer A,
agent i will update its probability pi(t) to pi(t + 1) obtained by applying
Bayes Theorem and given by
pi(t+1) =
p [τijα + (1− τij)µ]
p [τijα + (1− τij)µ] + (1− p) [τij(1− α) + (1− τij)(1− µ)]
, (2)
where p is written in the place of pi(t) for brevity sake. One interesting effect
here is that Bayes Theorem also applies to τij and the agent i also updates
its opinion about how likely j is to be trustworthy. We have a new τij(t+1)
given by
τij(t + 1) =
τij [pα+ (1− p)(1− α)]
τij [pα + (1− p)(1− α)] + (1− τij) [pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)]
. (3)
It makes sense to ask what happens if one adopts the same transformation
to log-odds. By calculating p/(1 − p), one does get rid of the numerator
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and taking the logarithm does lead us to an additive model. That is, for
νi(t) = ln(p/(1− p)), we have
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + ln
[
τijα + (1− τij)µ
τij(1− α) + (1− τij)(1− µ)
]
.
If one takes τij = 1, that is, certainty that all neighbors are not trustworthy,
the equation above has a simple constant additive part as second term, the
constant size of the step. However, in the general case, the term will change at
each interaction since it depends on τij . Similarly, the additive term equation
for θ ≡ ln(τ/(1− τ)) depends on p and will change with the dynamics. This
makes it simpler to work directly with the probabilities p and τ , instead of
using log-odds.
In the CODA original model, using p as the main variable was not a
good idea also because it approached 0 or 1 too fast, so that computational
limitations on the representation of real numbers became a real problematic
issue. As a matter of fact, it was usual to obtain values like 1− 10−300, that,
in any computer, is indistinguishable from 1.0. The same was not true for
ν, meaning it was a much better variable to use. As we will see bellow in
the simulation results, when introducing the possibility the neighbor could
be useless, the probabilities do not move to such problematic zones and,
therefore, we will not use log-odds from now on, with no trouble other than
the lack of simplification of the final model.
Finally, if, instead of OAj, we have that agent j preference is B, with
OBj being observed, we have, instead of Equations 2 and 3, the following
update rules:
pi(t+1) =
p [τij(1− α) + (1− τij)(1− µ)]
p [τij(1− α) + (1− τij)(1− µ)] + (1− p) [τijα+ (1− τij)µ]
, (4)
and
τij(t + 1) =
τij [p(1− α) + (1− p)α]
τij [p(1− α) + (1− p)α] + (1− τij) [p(1− µ) + (1− p)µ]
. (5)
The general effects of one single update can be seen in the Figures 1 and
2. Figure 1 shows the symmetrical case where α = 1 − µ, showing between
the two panels, the difference in effect that one obtains by agent j choosing
either A or B. As we can see, the reasonable assumption that the decisions
will have opposite effects is shown to be a good one, although a numerical
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Figure 1: Vector field showing the direction of the effects of one update for
α = 0.6 and µ = 0.4 depending on the different initial opinions of agent i.
Left Panel: Agent j prefers A. Right Panel: Agent j prefers B.
inspection will show they do not cancel each other exactly. We can also
see that the fact that agent j prefers A will only make A more likely for i,
increasing pi, when i trusts j to be more trustworthy than useless (τij > 0.5).
Otherwise, i will move in the opposite direction to that of j opinion, making
it a local contrarian.
Figure 2 shows us two non-symmetrical cases (α 6= 1 − µ). As we can
see, the effect of the type of agent with the likelhood (α or µ) further from
0.5 is stronger. This translates to the fact that, when trustworthy agents
are considered to be certain more often and useless ones are closer to a coin
flip, only for very low values of trust will agent i move as a contrarian. The
opposite happens when the useless agents are considered to choose the worst
choice more often than the trustworthy ones choose the better one.
One should notice that these are just the results of one update. As the
system evolves, some agents will randomly interact more often with agents
choosing A and others with agents choosing B. This means each one will be,
at first, led to a different region of the p − τ plane and, therefore, it is not
clear, just from looking at the arrow fields, what will happen in the system
as a whole.
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Figure 2: Vector field showing the direction of the effects of one update
depending on the different initial opinions of agent i. In every case, agent
j prefers A. Left Panel: α = 0.75 and µ = 0.4. Right Panel: α = 0.6 and
µ = 0.25.
3 Simulation results
The original CODA model was, in previous works, defined on a network
that dictated the neighbors that each agent could interact with. This was
necessary as it was the appearance of local self-reinforcing neighborhoods
that kept consensus from appearing and allowed extreme different beliefs
to evolve and co-exist. A fully connected model would trivially lead to a
consensus around the random size that started bigger, with all agents strongly
supporting it after a while.
Here, however, we are also interested in the dynamics of the trust between
the agents. In the original model, we can consider that only the pre-assigned
neighbors were considered to have information worthy of obtaining. But, in
the general case, that can be an effect of the dynamics. In order to explore
that, complete graphs will be assumed in the simulations presented here, so
that every agent will be able to interact with every other agent. The goal is to
explore if consensus appears or if the agents will naturally divide themselves
into groups of agents with similar opinions.
Simulations were performed using the software R [27]; the package “fields”
[28] was used to generate the arrow graphics. In the simulations, two distinct
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Figure 3: Temporal evolution of the histograms showing the distribution of
observed pi after different amounts of simulation time for N = 1, 000. In all
cases, α = 1 − µ = 0.55 and all agents started with τij = 0.5 for all values
of i and j. Left Panel: T = 200. Central Panel: T = 500. Right Panel:
T = 1, 000.
agents were randomly drawn at each step and the first agent updated it
probabilities from the observation of the second. Time T is measured as the
number of steps divided by the number of agents N , so that advancing T
by one means that, on average, each agent observed one other agent once.
The values of p in most simulations were randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution between 0.01 and 0.99, except when noted otherwise.
Figure 3 shows the temporal evolution of one realization of a symmetric
case, where α = 1−µ = 0.55 and all N = 1, 000 agents starting with τij = 0.5
for all values of i and j. We see that, in this case, at first, even after an average
of 200 interactions per agent, the probabilities are still randomly distributed
over all possible values. As a comparison, without trust, the CODA model
showed regions starting to stabilize with strong opinions as soon as T = 20.
Around T = 50, most opinions were already very strong (p close to 0 or 1)
and the general format of the distribution of choices would remain the same
from that point on [8].
With the introduction of trust, we see that the opinions eventually tend to
the extremes, but even at T = 500, we still have a significant but diminishing
number of agents with moderate opinions. However, those moderate opinions
tend to disappear, as we can see from the case where T = 1, 000. And
this is another important difference, since moderate opinions never really
disappeared in the original CODA algorithm, as they survived in the interface
between the extreme regions. Here, on the other hand, all agents eventually
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Figure 4: Histograms showing the distribution of observed pi for two different
cases when T = 50. In all cases, α = 1 − µ = 0.55 and all agents started
with τij = 0.5 for all values of i and j. Left Panel: α = 1− µ = 0.55. Right
Panel: α = 0.70 and µ = 0.55
make up their minds and, as we will see, learn to mistrust those who disagree
with them.
However, unlike previous implementations, the introduction of trust al-
lows a different behavior to appear, depending on the parameters. Figure 4
shows the distribution when T = 50 for two different cases, α = 1−µ = 0.55
at left and α = 0.70 and µ = 0.55 at right. What we see is that, in the first
case, as expected, too little time has passed and the system is at a similar,
undecided state, as it will still be when T = 200. However, the situation
for the second, non-symmetrical case, is quite different. One peak of strong
opinions is clearly formed near p = 0, but none appeared around p = 1.0.
As a matter of fact, very few agents keep an opinion in favor of A (p > 0.5)
and the system is close to reaching a consensus. Running that case a little
longer indeed leads the system to a full agreement, in this case, in favor of B.
This happens because the agents consider that the information of trustwor-
thy agents is far more reliable than the contrarian information of the useless
ones, that is µ is much closer to 0.5 than α. This initial better evaluation
of their peers makes it possible for the agents to reach an agreement before
they start having strong opinions and/or mistrusting each other.
Figure 5 shows the final results for different cases. All graphics depict
the average over 20 realization of the observed standard deviation of pi as a
function of the initial trust τij , chosen equal for all agents at the beginning.
When all agents agree, all pi are equal or very close and, therefore, the
standard deviation tends to zero. The opposite extreme has half of agents
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Figure 5: Standard deviation of pi as a function of initial trust τij . In all
cases, α = 1 − µ = 0.55 Left Panel: Effect of different number of agents
N . Right Panel: Different initial conditions for pi are shown. In the spread
condition, each pi was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between
0.01 and 0.99; for the close case, between 0.4 and 0.6, while the extreme case
had pi drawn uniformly in the regions between 0 and 0.01 and between 0.99
and 1.0.
with pi = 0 and the other half with pi = 1, for a standard deviation of 0.5.
The left panel shows the same case run with different number N of agents and
T = 1, 000. What we see resembles a finite case associated with a first order
transition between complete agreement among the agents, when the trust
starts high enough, and polarization between two disagreeing groups when
trust starts low. The right panel shows, for N = 200 that the value of τij
where the transition seems to happen depends also on the initial conditions
imposed on pi. When the agents start with moderate opinions, closer to
0.5, it is easier for agreement to happen. However, if the agents start with
an initial very strong opinion towards one of the options, agreement is only
possible if trust starts also high, so that agents with different choices can still
influence each other. The same basic behavior was observed in every case run
in the tests of the trust model, showing those results are quite robust. While
the CODA model would always lead to agreement in a complete graph and
to polarization if interaction were local, with self-reinforcing neighborhoods,
here we can observe both results in the same model, depending on the initial
level of trust in the population.
The effects on the trust between the agents, on the other hand, have a
much slower dynamics when compared to the dynamics of pi. The reason
for that is trivial. While each time an agent observes another, it updates
its value of pi, it updates just one of its N values of τij . Therefore, trust
10
pCo
un
t
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
p
Co
un
t
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
Figure 6: Temporal evolution of the histograms showing the distribution of
observed τij after different amounts of simulation time for N = 100. In all
cases, α = 1− µ = 0.55 and all agents started with τij = 0.5 for all values of
i and j. Left Panel: T = 100. Right Panel: T = 1, 000.
evolves very slowly, as can be seen in Figure 6 for a realization with only
N = 100 agents. It is clear that, even after 100 average interactions per
agent (T = 100), the system is still very close to its initial condition (every
tij = 0.5). This happens because, in average, each value of the trust matrix
τij had only one update. This causes the high central peak in the left panel
figure, corresponding to the large number of positions of τij that were not
updated at all. After T = 1, 000, that peak is much smaller and most agents
have some evaluation about how much to trust most of others, trusting those
who agree with them and distrusting the others.
Although the introduction of trust allows the existence of the two phases,
the dynamics associated to τij happens in a much larger time scale than the
dynamics of pi. That is, the decision if the system will converge to agreement
or polarization happens before there was time enough for the trust matrix to
change much. First, agents reinforce their opinions in one direction, simply
by randomly been exposed to one choice more than the other. Once they
start making up their minds, then they start trusting more those they agree
with and less those they disagree.
The system as a whole seems to be dominated by two opposing forces,
associated with different random walks. On one side, there is the tendency
of the average of pi to change, causing a stronger influence towards one of
the sides that would eventually lead to an agreement. On the other side, we
have the tendency of individual values of pi to move away from the moderate
11
region. And, as they get close to 0 or 1, agents tend to mistrust those who
disagree with them and not change their opinions much when faced with
disagreement. If the system remains in an undecided state long enough for
the more extreme opinions to become important, polarization ensues. How
much agents trust each other at first, therefore, determines which of these
two opposing forces will win eventually.
4 Conclusion
We have seen that, by introducing trust in the CODA model, we obtain
the realistic case where either agreement or polarization may be observed
in the long run, depending on the parameters and initial conditions of the
system. As it would be expected, the model says that when people trust
each other more, agreement is easier to be obtained. Also the quality of the
information plays an important role, in the sense of which α or µ is closer to
0.5. If trustworthy agents information is considered less random, agreement
is favored, otherwise, polarization is.
Finally it is interesting to stress the different time scales involved with
the two processes. It is a prediction of this model and, as such, a way to test
it that, when agreement will happen, it happens comparatively fast. On the
other hand, if the state of doubt remains for very long time in the society,
this allows mistrust to build, eventually leading to polarization.
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